The main security service in the connected world of cyber physical systems necessitates to authenticate a large number of nodes privately. In this paper, the private authentication problem is considered, that consists of a certificate authority, a verifier, many legitimate users (prover) and any arbitrary number of illegitimate users. Each legitimate user wants to be authenticated (using his personal key) by the verifier, while simultaneously wants to stay completely anonymous (even to the verifier and the CA). On the other hand, an illegitimate user must fail to authenticate himself. We analyze this problem from an information theoretical perspective. First, we propose a general interactive information-theoretic model for the problem. As a metric to measure the reliability, we consider the authentication key rate whose rate maximization has a trade-off with establishing privacy. Then, we analyze the problem in two different regimes: finite size regime (i.e., the variables are elements of a finite field) and asymptotic regime (i.e., the variables are considered to have large enough length). For both regimes, we propose schemes that satisfy the completeness, soundness and privacy properties. In finite size regime, the idea is to generate the authentication keys according to a secret sharing scheme. In asymptotic regime, we use a random binning based scheme which relies on the joint typicality to generate the authentication keys. Moreover, providing the converse proof, we show that our scheme achieves capacity in the asymptotic regime. For finite size regime our scheme achieves capacity for large field size.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth of cyber physical systems, the authentication is an essential security feature in the communication systems. The authentication protocol seeks the answer to who sends the data, is the user authorized to access the service or is the message received unaltered. Thus, based on application, these protocols may authenticate the user or the message. The traditional cryptography-based method for user authentication is based on key validation, that is if the key is valid according to a data set, e.g., public key or passwords. While for the message authentication, traditionally signed hash of the message is used.
Nowadays, by increasing concerns about privacy, users wish to stay anonymous when sending authentication requests. This has many emerging applications such as vehicular network [1] , cloud computing, distributed servers [2] , crypto-currencies and services on blockchain [3] . There is an inherent contradiction between the authentication and the privacy, for example a user wants to prove he has permission to access a service but he does not want to reveal his identity. In this paper, we study this problem, i.e., a private authentication (PA) problem, where a legitimate user can pass the authentication, but he does not reveal his identity even to the server (he hides in This work was partially supported by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF) under contract No. 96/53979. a group of users), while an illegitimate user (attacker) fails to authenticate. This happens in practice that the server should not distinguish the one who requests the service with which key is authenticated [1] . Though there are cryptographic based method that uses tokens for private authentication, to the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied fundamentally.
Traditional solutions for private authentication (privacy against external attacker) is based on computational complexity crypto method which is studied in works such as [4] and [5] . However, the problem can be studied in an information theoretically setup to find its fundamental limits. With no privacy concern, authentication problem has been studied fundamentally in works such as [6] - [8] . In [6] , Simmons considers message authentication over a noiseless channel with a shared key between two sides of authentication, where the lower bounds for impersonation attack and substitution attack are established. In [7] , this work has been extended to noisy channels. In [8] hypothesis testing is proposed to derive generalized lower bounds on impersonation attack and substitution attack. Using characteristics of wireless channel, keyless authentication has been analyzed in works such as [9] , [10] . All these works consider message authentication with no privacy constraints. There are also some works that consider privacy from information theory perspective. With no connection to the authentication problem, [11] derives the capacity of private information retrieval, and [12] studies privacy in data base systems. In biometric security systems, a user wishes to authenticate himself by some biometric characteristics, such as fingerprint, which is called enrollment sequence. The privacy leakage is leakage of information about enrollment sequence. [13] , [14] derived the trade-off between secret key rate and privacy leakage rate.
In this paper, we consider a PA problem consisting of a certificate authority (CA), a verifier (i.e., server), many legitimate users and any number of attackers. A legitimate user wishes to be authenticated to gain access to a service, while he wants to stay anonymous to anyone observing the authentication process (including the verifier). An attacker wants to impersonate himself as a legitimate user and gain access to the service, he is not permitted to. The verifier wants to understand that the user who requests authentication (prover) either is a legitimate user or is an attacker. CA is an entity that shares correlated randomness between the verifier and the legitimate users. This randomness can be used by the verifier in the authentication process to distinguish an attacker from a legitimate user.
In an authentication protocol, two conditions should be considered: the legitimate user who follows the protocol can pass the authentication (completeness condition) and an attacker fails to authenticate (soundness condition). The privacy condition is satisfied when the user stays anonymous, i.e., the verifier cannot distinguish legitimate users identities. In addition, it is desirable that the exposure of the key of a user releases as less information as possible, so we consider a reliability metric as total key rate of the users.
As a solution to the above problem, we propose a general interactive information-theoretic protocol. Our proposed PA protocol is considered in two regimes: finite size and asymptotic regimes. In finite regime, the variables used in the PA protocol are elements of a finite field. In asymptotic regime, the variables of the protocol are sequences of length n, for arbitrary large n.
For both the finite and asymptotic regimes, we propose an achievable protocol. This means that in each case we propose a PA protocol that satisfies the completeness, soundness and privacy conditions. In the finite regime if the size of the field tends to infinity the achievable rate reaches the upper bound. In the asymptotic regime, the proposed scheme achieves the capacity. Our finite size scheme uses the idea that the key of the legitimate users should lie on a specific polynomial (inspired by Shamir secret sharing [15] ). Here, the completeness and privacy conditions are satisfied with probability 1 and the probability of soundness is its maximum. For the asymptotic regime, we propose an optimal scheme, where the main idea is using the random binning and the joint typicality between the keys of the legitimate users and the data available at the verifier. All three conditions (completeness, soundness and privacy) are satisfied with probabilities arbitrary close to 1.
Notations: Capital letters are used to show random variables and small letters are their realizations. The mutual information between X and Y is shown with I(X; Y ), H(X) shows the entropy of X.
[K] = {1, 2, · · · , K} and X ∼ Y means that X and Y are identically distributed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A PA protocol consists of a CA, a verifier, K legitimate users and an attacker 1 . Each legitimate user wishes to authenticate himself to the verifier without revealing his identity. The PA protocol shown in Fig. 1 , has two phase: 1) Key distribution phase: in this phase CA generates the set V ∈ V using encoding function f c : W → V, where W is an authentication space, and sends V to the verifier. Using mapping f k :
, CA generates C k ∈ C as personal key of user k and sets C = {C 1 , · · · , C K } ∈ C K . CA sends C k to legitimate user k, each C k will be used to authenticate user k. 2) Authentication phase: user k wants to prove knowledge of C k ∈ V for k ∈ [K] without revealing index "k" to the verifier. A prover is a user who sends the authentication request to the verifier. We have two cases: Case I: H = 0 (the prover is the legitimate user), Case II: H = 1 (the prover is an attacker).
When the prover claims that he has someC ∈ C, the verifier decides onĤ, whereĤ = 0 means the verifier accepts the prover as legal user, andĤ = 1 means he rejects the prover. The Authentication phase consists of three steps. Case I: H = 0
Step 1: The verifier, knowing V , uses encoding function f v : 1 Only one attacker is considered, but any number of them can be tolerated.
V → S × M to generate S and M , i.e., (S, M ) = f v (V ). The output of the encoding function has two parts because one part is used as secret for authentication in the following steps, S, and the other part is used as helper data for the prover, M . So, the verifier keeps S and sends M to the prover.
Step 2: The prover (legitimate user k)
The prover sendsŜ k to the verifier.
Step 3: IfŜ k = S, the verifier accepts the prover and announceŝ H = 0. Otherwise, he rejects the prover and announcesĤ = 1. Case II: H = 1
Step 1: Since the verifier has no knowledge of H at the beginning of the authentication phase, this step is exactly the same as the first step of case I.
Step 2: The prover (an attacker) computesŜ = f p (M ), since the only information available at the attacker is M . f p can be any decoding function such that f p : M → S. The prover sendsŜ to the verifier.
Step 3: The same as third step of case I, ifŜ = S, the verifier announcesĤ = 0. Otherwise, he announcesĤ = 1.
The PA protocol should satisfy three constraints: completeness, soundness and privacy. The completeness property assures that a legitimate user is accepted. This means that if the prover is legitimate user, then the verifier announcesĤ = 0. So, we define P e1 -completeness:
Next, the soundness property guarantees that an attacker is rejected. This means that if the prover is an attacker, then the verifier announcesĤ = 1. So, we define P e2 -soundness as:
To make user identity private, k-th prover's request should be indistinguishable from the verifier's perspective, i.e., knowing M and V all requests must be identically distributed. So perfect privacy is defined as:
In the proposed model, we use the P p -privacy property as:
Since C k is the personal key of user k, it is desired that (C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C K ) has the maximum entropy, so that exposure of a user's key reveals minimum information about other users' keys. On the other hand, for preserving privacy, it is desired that the personal key of the users have common information. So, there is a trade-off between maximizing this entropy and establishing privacy. Considering l as the length of the keys, we define reliability metric as total key rate:
Our goal is to design a PA protocol that satisfies completeness, soundness and privacy properties. Two regimes are considered: finite size and asymptotic regimes. 
In key distribution phase, CA generates V and C = {C 1 , · · · , C K } ∈ C K using fc : W → V and f k : V → C, he sends V to the verifier and C k to the user k. In Authentication phase, the verifier generates S as a secret and M as a helper data using encoding function fv and he sends M to the prover. If the prover is the legitimate user (case I), he uses decoding function fp on C k and M to computeŜ k and sendsŜ k to the verifier. If the prover is an attacker (case II), he uses M and an arbitrary decoding function f p to computeŜ and sendsŜ to the verifier. If the received secret at the verifier is equal to S, the prover passes authentication, unless he fails.
a decoding function f p and mapping functions f k for k ∈ [K], such that P e1 = 0, P e2 = 1 |S| and P p = 0. Definition 2: A key rate R is achievable for a PA protocol in the asymptotic regime, if there are encoding functions f c and f v , a decoding function f p and mapping functions f k for k ∈ [K], such that P e1 , P e2 and P p tend to zero as the length of the variables goes to infinity.
Definition 3:
The key capacity for a PA protocol is:
C sup{R : R is an achievable key rate for a PA protocol}.
For both regimes, we design achievable protocols and for asymptotic regime we show optimality of the proposed protocol.
III. FINITE SIZE REGIME
In this section, we consider a finite field version of the protocol, thus we assume all the variables of the protocol are chosen as elements of a finite field, i.e, W = GF (q L ), C = (GF (q L )) lc , V = (GF (q L )) lv , M = (GF (q L )) lm and S = (GF (q L )) ls , which q is a prime number and L is a finite integer. l c , l v , l m and l s are integers that will be determined through the scheme. All operations in this section are done in the finite field GF (q L ).
In the following, we propose an achievable PA protocol for the finite regime case. Also we show that the key rate of the proposed scheme tends to the upper bound when the size of the field is large. The design of the protocol is inspired by the idea of Shamir's secret sharing [15] . The idea is that if the prover is a legitimate user, his key (C k ) must fit in a polynomial. The degree of this polynomial is d = K. Also, d is known to all parties participating in the protocol.
Theorem 1:
The key rate R = K 2 + 1 2L logL K is achievable for a PA protocol in finite size regime.
Proof: First, we design coding of the protocol: CA: Using his encoding function f c , CA generates K random points (as the keys of the legitimate users) and compute the polynomial passes through these points. The details of the encoding function and mapping functions at CA are as follow: 1) CA chooses X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X K (K distinct random numbers) from the finite field GF (q L ), and CA chooses K variables from the the field W = GF (q L ), independently and uniformly at random and sets them as Y 1 , Y 2 , · · · Y K . 2) CA chooses a 0 from the field W = GF (q L ) independently and uniformly at random.
3) The outputs of encoding function and mapping functions at CA are f c : V = {a 0 , (X 1 , Y 1 ), · · · , (X K , Y K )} and f k : C k = (X k , Y K ). So, l v = 2K + 1 and l c = 2. 4) CA sends V to the verifier and C k to the user k for k ∈ [K].
Verifier: The verifier sets a 0 as the secret. The detail follows: 1) Having access to V , the verifier sets S = a 0 . 2) Since k+1 points can uniquely determine a k degree polynomial, the verifier computes unique polynomial f (X) of degree d = K that passes through {(0, a 0 ), (X 1 , Y 1 ), · · · , (X K , Y K )}.
3) The verifier selects d new points from the space GF (q L ), that is the verifier chooses at random d distinct elements M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M d of GF (q L ) where M i = X j , ∀i = 1, · · · , d and ∀j = 1, · · · , K. To make this possible we need that q L ≥ K + d + 1. The verifier computes the value of polynomial at the new points, i.e., f (M i ) for i ∈ {1, · · · , d}. 4) The outputs of encoding function at the verifier are f v : M = {(M 1 , f (M 1 )), · · · , (M d , f (M d ))} and S = a 0 . So, l m = 2d = 2K and l s = 1.
5) The verifier sends M to the prover and keeps S.
Prover (legitimate user k): Using decoding function f p , the prover wishes to prove that his key is a valid point on the polynomial f (x). The detail of the decoding function follows: 1) Since a d degree polynomial can cover d+1 randomly chosen points from a GF (q L ), knowing M and C k = (X k , f (X k )), the prover has access to d + 1 distinct points of the polynomial f (x) (of degree d), so he can derive the polynomial and compute a 0 .
2) The output of the decoding function is f p :Ŝ k = a 0 .
Remark 1: The attacker only knows M . He can use any arbitrary decoding function f p to estimate S. His success probability is derived in the analysis of the soundness property. Now with determining coding functions, we show the 0completeness, 1 |S| -soundness and 0-privacy properties of the proposed protocol.
0-completeness:
The user k has (X k , Y K ) and M = {(M 1 , f (M 1 )), · · · , (M d , f (M d ))}, d+1 points of polynomial, derives the polynomial with Lagrange interpolation and compute a 0 [15] . So,Ŝ k = S = a 0 for all k ∈ [K] and thus:
(1)
This proves the 0-completeness property of the scheme. 
This means that, the best possible attack strategy is to guess the secret. Thus, the success probability of the attacker is equal to 1 q L , and it shows the larger the size of the finite field, the lower the probability of attack. This completes the proof of 1 |S| -soundness property. 0-privacy: As stated above, every legitimate user can compute S correctly. So,
, and 0-Privacy is satisfied. This means, since every legitimate prover always sends S, the verifier can not distinguish which user requests the authentication. Now with determining the protocol we can compute the key rate of the proposed protocol:
where (a) comes from the fact that Y i , for i ∈ [K], is chosen uniformly at random, and (b) can be obtained by considering that X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X K are chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of cardinality K of the field GF (q L ). Corollary 1: It is obvious that an upper bound on key rate equals to K and (3) tends to this upper bound, K, as q L → ∞, proof in [17] .
Remark 2: It should be noted that any time, the verifier receives an authentication request, he must send exactly the same set M to the prover. More precisely, if the prover is an attacker and the set M sends to him in two requests, differs only in one point, then he has d + 1 points that the polynomial f (x) fits. Thus, he can compute S correctly.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC REGIME
In this section, we consider the asymptotic version of the PA protocol, i.e., all the variables of the protocol are sequences of length n for arbitrary large n, in particular we define C k = Y n k . We propose the optimal PA protocol for its asymptotic version. This means that we show that the key rate of the proposed protocol achieves capacity. The idea is to provide the verifier and the legitimate provers with correlated data (which is done by CA). And then to verify the existence of this correlation. This verification is based on a random binning technique and is done in an interactive protocol. The idea was also used in the biometric security systems [13] , [14] in a different setup.
Theorem 2: The capacity of the PA protocol in asymptotic scheme is equal to KH(Y ).
Proof: Converse: For converse, it is obvious that R ≤ KH(Y ).
Achivability: The proof is based on the strong typicality defined in [18] . We propose the achievable scheme by defining the encoding, decoding and mapping functions at CA, the verifier and the legitimate users.
CA: First we describe the codebook generation at CA. Considering auxiliary random variables X ∈ X and U ∈ U, fix a joint distribution P U XY (u, x, y) = P X (x)P Y |X (y|x) P U |X (u|x), i.e., U → X → Y forms a Markov chain such that 0 < I(U ; Y ) ≤ I(X; Y ) = µ. obtaining P U (u) = x P U X (ux) and fixing ξ and ξ such that ξ > ξ > 0, form the set Q by randomly and independently generating 2 nR sequences of U n , each according to
Randomly partition the set Q to 2 nR equal size subsets (bins). So, each bin contains 2 n(R−R ) sequences. Each sequence u n ∈ Q can be shown as u n (m, s), where m is the bin index and s is the index of sequence in the bin m. The sequences u n (m, s) constitutes the codebook, which is revealed to every participants of the protocol (the verifier and the provers). Now, we describe the details of encoding function f c and mapping functions f k : 1) From distribution P X (x), generate an i.i.d sequence X n . 2) Conditioned on X n , randomly and conditionally independently generate K sequences Y n 1 , Y n 2 , · · · , Y n K each according to the conditional distribution P Y |X (y|x), i.e., Y n k |X n ∼
3) The outputs of encoding function and mapping functions at CA are f c : V = {X n , Y n 1 , Y n 2 , · · · , Y n K } and f k : C k = Y n k . 4) CA sends V to the verifier and C k to the user k for k ∈ [K].
Verifier: Using encoding function f v , the verifier determines S and M based on finding jointly typical sequences U n with X n . The detail of the encoding function follows: 1) Let T (n) ξ (X, U ) be the set of jointly typical sequences (X, U ). The verifier finds a sequence u n ∈ Q that is jointly typical with X n , i.e., (X n , u n (m, s)) ∈ T n ξ (X, U ). If no such sequence exists, the verifier chooses a sequence from Q randomly. If there are more than one sequence, the verifier chooses one of them randomly. 2) Knowing u n , its bin index, m, and the index of sequence in the bin, s, are the outputs of encoding function.
3) The verifier sends M = m to the prover and keeps S = s.
Prover (legitimate user k): The prover wants to prove that his key, Y n k is correlated to the verifier's sequence X n . Thus knowing the bin index, he estimatesû as a sequence in that bin. The detail follows: 1) Knowing Y n k and bin index M , the prover looks for a sequence u n in bin M that is jointly typical with Y n k , i.e., (u n (M, s), Y n ) ∈ T (n) ξ (U, Y ). One of the following cases occur:
• There is only one sequence in bin M that is jointly typical with Y n −→ the prover takes this sequence asû n .
• There are more than one sequence in bin M that are jointly typical with Y n −→ the prover chooses one of these sequences randomly and sets it asû n . • There is no sequence in bin M that is jointly typical with Y n −→ the prover choosesû n at random from the bin. 2) The index (ŝ) ofû n in bin M is the output of the decoding function at the prover, i.e., f p :Ŝ k =ŝ.
Remark 3: The attacker only knows M , i.e., the index of the bin. His information about the index of sequence in the bin (the secret) and his success probability is discussed in analysis of soundness in [17, Appendix B ].
An outline of the analysis of probabilities of error follows. The detailed analysis is provided in [17, Appendix B] :
For completeness, error occurs ifŜ k = S. By setting R > I(U ; X) andR − R < I(U ; Y ), there are more than 2 nI(U ;X) sequences in Q, using covering lemma [18] , with high probability the verifier finds a sequence u n that is jointly typical with X n . On the other hand, by law of large number (LLN), the prover finds a sequenceû n that is jointly typical with Y n k . And by packing lemma, with high probability the prover finds a unique sequence. This proves that lim n→∞ P e1 = 0.
The soundness property is derived by showing that as n → ∞, If {Ŝ 1 =Ŝ k }, privacy may be violated. So P[Ŝ 1 =Ŝ k ] is an upper bound on the probability of the event that privacy is violated. Utilizing similar technique used in the proof of completeness property we show that the probability ofŜ 1 =Ŝ k tends to zero. Since the number of legitimate prover is finite (K), the probability ofŜ 1 =Ŝ k for k ∈ [K] tends to zero. Now, we analyze the key rate of the proposed scheme:
where (a) comes from the fact that Y n 1 , Y n 2 , · · · , Y n K are independent from each other conditioned on X n and (b) is derived by
. In the converse we showed that R ≤ KH(Y ). The difference of H(Y ) and H(Y |X) is equal to I(X; Y ) = µ. If µ → 0, then C = KH(Y ) is achievable.
Remark 4: Probability of soundness is proportional to 1 nI(U ;Y ) . Setting U = X, results in the fastest diminishing probability of soundness.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS Computational complexity in the finite size scheme: We consider the participants of the protocol derive the coefficient of the polynomial by Lagrange interpolation. However, there are efficient algorithms that can compute a 0 directly from d + 1 points without driving the polynomial [19] . Therefore the computational complexity is of order d.
Non secure links: In the system model, we assume the links between the participants are secure. But, when the links are non-secure, i.e., there is an eavesdropper that can hearŜ k for k ∈ [K], the problem is an interesting future direction.
Security condition: An extra condition can be considered, by which the prover should not get any further information about other users' keys at the end of the PA protocol. This means that H(c i |M, c k ) = H(c i |c k ) for i ∈ [K]\{k}. This condition is satisfied in the asymptotic scheme. But, in the finite length scheme, the legitimate prover knows that f (x) fits the legitimate users' keys. And, he knows that the points in M are not the keys of legitimate user. This reveals to him that any other points on the polynomial (not in M and not his own key) is a possible key for the other legitimate users. So, to reduce the information leakage about the other users' key in the protocol we must have q L >> K. Note that the condition H(c i |M, c k ) = H(c i ) cannot be satisfied simultaneously with the privacy property. Because, for privacy, some correlation between legitimate users' keys is needed.
Partition to smaller groups: To satisfy the above security condition in finite length scheme, our scheme concludes q L >> K. One solution can be to partition the legitimate users into smaller groups with maximum size of K < K and PA protocol can be performed within these smaller groups. Then, it is enough to have q L >> K . However, this weakens the privacy.
